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Abstract  
This article explores the impact of contextual fragility on development in practice in the 
context of partnership working. The utilization of oppressive legislation and stringent 
registration for CSOs by a state fearful of losing political hegemony resulted in limited 
community participation and CBO reluctance to engage in advocacy activities deemed 
political despite northern partner eagerness. Financial distress led to a partnership 
termination, partial and non-implementation of some development activities. Utilizing 
contextual analysis to unmask the heterogeneous nature of fragile contexts can be a 
valuable starting point in capturing unique complexities and irregularities in each context to 
inform program planning.  
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Introduction  
There is an increasing recognition that an enabling environment for civil society 
organisations (CSOs) such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community- based 
organisations (CBOs) is vital for sustainable development.  However, despite this 
recognition, some governments embrace CSOs at international level while restricting their 
operations at national levels for fear of losing political hegemony (Hayman et al. 2013). 
While state role in development remains a subject of ideological debate, there is consensus 
it needs to be competent in delivering its core functions which Kingsbury (2014) identifies 
as: equal and consistent application of the law, impartial judiciary - police and defence force; 
levying taxation; overseeing infrastructure including transport and communications; the 
delivery of education and some degree of health care. Hence, state capacity to deliver these 
functions, and making use of aid to effectively sustain development, have been identified as 
key development (Fukuyama 2004). States at the bottom end of functionality are 
characterised by state failure or fragility (Kingsbury 2014) and are more dependent on aid 
often channelled via CSOs due to state - donor distrust. However, CSOs are not immune to 
the implications of operating in such contexts. Whatever the implications maybe, they are 
context dependent.  This suggests labelling states failed or fragile based on a standardized 
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framework potentially limits attempts to understand how each context impacts on 
development in practice.  
        While there is consensus that state fragility is, multidimensional and underlined by 
numerous causes (Mcloughlin 2012), the discourse has been accused of failing to pay 
sufficient attention to the analysis of “... unique contextual factors in both fragile state 
development literature and practice” (Ware 2014: 13). This is despite theoretical acceptance 
of such factors being important to development work. For example, the OECD principle 1 of 
Principles of for Good International Engagement for in Fragile States and Situations calls for 
sensitivity to context. Notably, appropriate consideration of unique contextual factors is a 
prerequisite for understanding how specific fragile contexts impact on development in 
practice which is crucial in informing future practice.   While a broad programme of research 
which considers contextualized investigations is required, this paper aims to make a 
contribution to our understanding of how contextual fragility impacts on development in 
practice through an INGO - CBO partnership case study supporting vulnerable children.  It 
does so by exploring the experiences and perspectives of development actors in the 
partnership among other collaborations in Zimbabwe, a country which has repeatedly 
identified as a fragile and failed state (Makuwira 2014; Brown and Stewart 2009; Fund for 
Peace 2017).  
 
Background: Civil Society - State relations in Zimbabwe  
The Rhodesian colonial government (1890 – 1980), now Zimbabwe, adopted segregationist 
policies towards the black majority, which denied them rights to participate in democratic 
institutions (Moyo 1993). After independence, the state encouraged formation of CSOs 
driven by a desire to build national unity (Moyo 2000). These mobilized around social 
services while those from the early 1990s onwards began focusing on human rights and 
governance, HIV/AIDs and gender, black empowerment and environmental concerns 
(Raftopoulos 2000). This coincided with the introduction of neo liberal policies (Macdonald 
2000) which left the poor increasingly reliant on CSOs for social services. Against a backdrop 
of state encouragement of CSOs formation, Moyo (1993) argues that organisations formed 
during this period suffered from lack of political space and dependency on state tutelage, 
which curtailed self-determination. While the lack of pluralism resulted in the formation of 
organisations only focusing on their immediate concerns, the armed struggle leading to 
independence 
“produced a violent culture of intimidation and fear within ranks of the liberation 
movement themselves and among their social base of peasant supporters…this 
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created an environment of death, terror and fear … to the utter misery of peasants 
who had to contend with equally brutal colonial forces. This resulted in a culture of 
fear in which violence was perpetrated in the name of nationalism and socialism… 
this has continued after independence with the same consequence. This is why 
peasants are conspicuously afraid of ZANU PF, particularly during elections: the 
campaign tactics of the ruling party are based on intimidation and death threats” 
(Moyo 1993: 12)   
 
These assertions tally with 2008 and 2013 election events whereby opposition party 
supporters in some rural communities experienced state sponsored violence (Amnesty 
International 2013).  The 2008 election dispute resulted in a coalition government between 
Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC).  However, due to the coalition’s fragile nature, this provided no 
respite for long persecuted CSOs which the opposition relied on for technical expertise 
(International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law [ICNL] 2017).  
       Since winning 2013 elections by a majority, ZANU PF has been preceding over a crippling 
socio economic and political crisis. This has instigated the rise of less structured social 
movements organised via social media. While civil society actors are increasingly vocal in 
their demands for state accountability, ZANU PF has responded by a nationwide crackdown, 
including unleashing threats, violence and arrests (ICNL 2017). As of November 2017, the 
ruling party adopted a conciliatory tone towards the opposition after an army intervention 
supported by protestors from all political divides culminated in the ousting of President 
Robert Mugabe. Currently at the helm is the former vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa 
and whether his conciliatory tone translates to real change on the ground remains to be 
seen particularly with regards to forth-coming general elections in July 2018.  
 
The Legislative Environment  
A fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe by African Commission on Human Rights (ACHPR) in 
2002 highlighted the revival of old laws utilized by the colonial state to control and limit civil 
liberties e.g. Public Order and Security Act, (POSA) 2002 and the Private Voluntary 
Organizations Act (PVO). Section 5 of the POSA makes it an offence to establish an 
organisation to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means, usurp its functions or 
coerce it through physical force, boycotts and civil disobedience.  The PVO act, which 
governs CSOs existence and operations dates back to 1967 and was enacted in 1995 for NGO 
registration almost in its original version (International Bar Association [IBA] 2004). 
Registration became mandatory in 2002 with penalties such as fines and imprisonment for 
carrying out activities or soliciting funds without registration (ICNL 2017).  Under the 
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auspices of ‘public interest’ as stipulated in section 21, the overseeing minister has power, 
subject to own discretion, to deregister any CSO (Raftopolous 2000). As Michael (2004) 
argues, ‘Public interest’ can be used by the state to legitimize its own interests.  Further 
concerns for CSOs came in 2004 as the state sought to introduce a NGO Bill, a stringent 
possible successor to the PVO act which sought to prohibit registration of foreign NGOs 
focusing governance and local CSOs receiving foreign funding for governance issues (IBA 
2004). The implications of this would have been severe given that in development aid, good 
governance is viewed as crucial for poverty eradication (World Bank 2002). Against a 
backdrop of protests, the bill was abruptly shelved.  
 
Theoretical framework: Fragile state  
While the concept fragile state is subject to debate, Stewart and Brown (2009: 7) categorise 
state fragility into three dimensions:   
• Authority failures where the state lacks the authority to protect its citizens from 
violence including organised political violence 
• Service failures where the state fails to ensure that all citizens have access to basic 
services such as health, basic education inter alia 
• Legitimacy failures where the state lacks legitimacy in majority of citizen’s eyes as 
partly evidenced by suppression of the opposition, absence of civil and political 
liberties and media control. 
Beyond a fragile state lies a failed state described as one, which has regressed further into 
failure to provide political goods and impose order resulting in total breakdown of political 
order and systems of governance (Rotberg 2003).  This entails international risk and 
complete failure to provide basic needs for citizens. Though Zimbabwe was identified as a 
failed state or bordering state failure between 2006 – 2008 (Muvingi 2008) as Makuwira 
(2014) argues, some governance structures remained in place. Hence, far from authority 
breakdown to maintain order, there was a government albeit a very authoritarian one. This 
raises questions regarding labelling Zimbabwe a failed state. Crucially, this suggests labels 
can mask the reality that states can fail in some aspects while still being functional 
(Mcloughlin 2012).  
             Stewart and Brown’s (2009) categorization of a fragile state however closely fits with 
Zimbabwe’s situation.  In relation to authority failures, there is evidence of state sponsored 
human rights violations and political intimidation (Amnesty international 2013) with the 
police labelled the worst perpetrator of violence against citizens at the behest of the ruling 
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party (Mavhinga 2016).  As Mavhinga notes, this has been accompanied by presidential 
threats at the judiciary for upholding citizens’ right to protest which sought to undermine its 
independence. In terms of services failure, there has been a drastic deterioration in health 
services, sanitation and water (Fournier and Whittall 2009) and education.  Legitimacy 
failures have been glaring as evidenced by mass protests against the state with political 
activists bearing state violence brunt (Zimbabwe Peace Project 2015). Furthermore, some 
protests were banned which violated citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of 
expression enshrined in Zimbabwe’s constitution (Mavhinga 2016).   
          While to some extent, this supports Zimbabwe’s categorization as a fragile state, solely 
situating this study in this framework potentially masks the heterogeneous nature of fragile 
contexts.  This consequently limits our understanding of how contextualized fragility impacts 
on development in practice, hence the need to consider Zimbabwe’s additional unique 
contextual factors discussed below.   
        There is ample evidence that the introduction of economic structural adjustment 
programmes from 1992 onwards had disastrous social outcomes thereby turning one of 
Africa’s best health care and education system into shambles (Macdonald 2000). Thereafter, 
the chaotic violent land reform program resulted in low farming productivity and 
plummeting foreign currency flows as farms landed in the hands of ill equipped ZANU PF 
elites (The Economist 2016) just as the HIV/AIDs epidemic imploded (UNAIDS 2016).  This, 
exacerbated by droughts in the region reduced Zimbabwe to a food aid case.  
            Partly due to irrational monetary policies, the period before the coalition government 
witnessed the highest hyperinflation in the 21st at 80 billion, (The Economist 2016) but the 
adoption of multiple currencies i.e. mainly the South African rand and US$ temporarily 
stabilised the economy. However, since 2013, ZANU PF has been presiding over a weak 
economy dogged by rampant corruption, mass unemployment, a cash crisis which 
culminated in the introduction of much criticized bond notes (The Economist 2017). By 
considering these additional unique contextual factors, this paper aims to present a more 
nuanced discussion on how contextualized fragility impacts on development in practice.  
 
Study Context and Case Selection 
This study was conducted in rural Manicaland, Zimbabwe. While the larger study explored, 
partnership working between INGO Y – CBO X in supporting vulnerable children (Madziva 
2017), this paper focuses on the impact of a fragile context on development in practice as 
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one of the themes. At the time of study commencement in 2006, Zimbabwe was going 
through a major socio-political and economic crisis, albeit still on going.  
        The selection of the original case study selection was based on a desk top research 
process of eliminating urban-based development partnerships between INGOs and CBOs 
focusing on vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS using the Directory of Development 
Organisations operating in Zimbabwe. At that time, the INGO Y and CBO X partnership was 
the only one identified in rural Zimbabwe. 
 
Methods and study participants  
Research participants were recruited to participate via purposive sampling as this enabled 
engaging those possessing knowledge and experience of doing development work in the 
fragile context on the back of the partnership case study.  Individual in-depth interviews 
were utilised for data collection and documentary analysis, which entails studying of existing 
documents (Hammersley and Atkison 1995) was utilised to further understand and 
illuminate on the impact of contextual fragility. Documents analysed in this regard include; 
Annual Reports, Records of Proceedings Annual Review Workshop Reports and Policy 
Documents, Research Papers and Evaluation Reports. 
         Study participants on this theme included 2 INGO staff; 2 key informants (development 
consultants) and 6 CBO Staff with a combined average of 10 years’ experience of working in 
development in Zimbabwe. All participants held degree and or postgraduate level 
qualifications with an age range of 31 – 55 years old.  
             The study received approval from London Metropolitan University Research Ethics 
Review Committee. Informed and written consent were obtained from all participants. 
Participants were anonymised by using alphabetic letters to ensure confidentiality while 
retaining organisational link. Given topic sensitivity, the organisations have been 
anonymised.  
 
Data Transcription and Analysis  
Each in-depth interview was held in English and lasted an average of 50 minutes. Interviews 
were digitally recorded and transferred as audio files to a computer before transcription. 
Thematic Framework, a method of data analysis which involves organising data by emerging 
themes (Ritchie et al., 2004) was used for data analysis. The researcher began by indexing 
the data, which involved using labels that are semantically close to the terms being 
represented. The index was manually applied by inserting references in the margins of 
Cathrine Madziva 
 
scripts wherever a relevant theme was identified across the entire data set to enable cross 
analysis.  Thereafter, data were sorted by themes via thematic charts.  
 
Findings    
This section presents study findings based on emerging themes as follows: an oppressive 
CSOs legislative framework; work permit challenges, financial distress; advocacy and 
lobbying challenges. 
 
An Oppressive CSOs Legislative Framework  
Findings indicate that the legislative environment was perceived extremely challenging for 
INGO Y and CBO X, as well as other CSOs in the country. Though never signed into law, the 
NGO bill caused uncertainty as noted:   
“It [NGO Bill] actually sent a lot of international donor agencies scurrying for cover; a 
lot of international donors and INGOs relocated to Botswana, South Africa, Zambia in 
time to escape the bill; they really thought that it was going to be signed but it 
worked, the result is that a lot of CBOs, NGOs collapsed” (KI P)  
 
“It [bill] made us feel vulnerable as a foreign INGO.  Some pulled out around that 
time because of uncertainty, we had a neighbour here, they were from Sweden and 
they relocated to Zambia” (SC – INGO Y) 
 
As explained above, the bill led to the collapse of local CSOs due to less funding availability 
as some donors and INGOs relocated. While INGO Y continued working in Zimbabwe, it felt 
vulnerable given its political approach to poverty eradication: 
“If INGO Y were to register under the NGO bill, INGO Y would present current 
activities … highlight that their concern was to fight structural causes of poverty 
which is how the organisation works. This is criminal according to the provisions of 
the bill. INGO Y is interested in addressing the structural or root causes of poverty 
and not just address the symptoms” (Record of Proceedings of the INGO Y – 
Zimbabwe Annual Meeting, 2005: 13). 
 
As INGO Y weighed the bill’s implications, CBO X felt challenged as remaining weary donors 
committed to short term funding as explained:  
“The situation is not conducive, anytime they [donors and INGOs] can be affected by 
the NGO bill. They say no to longer-term grants because suppose the government 
actually comes in and closes the whole show. This is a big problem for us because we 
can’t plan ahead” (SA – CBO X).  
 
As noted, short term funding had negative implications for projects planning. In line with 
this, the restrictiveness of POSA and the police force’s failure to respect citizens’ rights 
emerged problematic: 
Cathrine Madziva 
 
“This POSA still controls the meeting of people, the police are not respecting the rights 
of citizens, the right to demonstrate, express opinions, the right to meet even if its 
non-political meetings. Someone always wants to see what you are meeting to discuss 
about … the environment is not very open and this place is very restrictive” (SC – INGO 
Y) 
 
As explained above, a restrictive environment limited community mobilization with negative 
implications for participation. After the bill was shelved, evidence suggests the environment 
remained hostile:  
“Even in the absence of the NGO bill, district and provisional authorities have sought 
to control and monitor the activities of NGOs … this has resulted in the deterioration 
of relations between government and NGOs”.  
(INGO Y Annual Report 2005: 9) 
 
In line with the oppressive legislative framework, findings suggest it took CBO X years to 
obtain government registration which was perceived extremely challenging as noted below: 
 
“It was a long struggle, it took us over 5 years to get registered with the government, 
and yet when looking for funders, they will say, are you a registered CBO, if you are 
not registered then we cannot become partners… you are moved from one office to 
another, it’s as if the government doesn’t want you [CBO] to be registered” (SA CBO X) 
 
This left the CBO in a challenging situation as some funders wouldn’t work with unregistered 
organizations, even though registration wasn’t yet mandatory.  
 
Work Permit Challenges for Expatriate Staff 
Findings indicate that INGO Y contended with immigration challenges pertaining to its 
international staff as highlighted below: 
“INGO Y was generally concerned with the negative changes in the operating 
environment … the deportation orders served on key INGO Y staff, i.e. the previous 
country director and administrator, the difficulties of securing work-permits for 
remaining and new staff” (Record of Proceedings of the INGO Y – Zimbabwe Annual 
Meeting 2005: 13). 
 
The deportation of key country programme workers posed challenges for programmes’ 
continuity for INGO Y and partners. 
 
Financial Distress  
 
Findings suggest that CBO X lost money intended for development activities due to bank 
closures at the height of the economic crisis. In response, the partner, Donor V abruptly 
terminated the partnership as explained below:   
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“We went into partnership with Donor V, I think we operated with them for two 
years and they came here for an audit.  That time, some of the banks here closed and 
some of the monies we had banked had come from Donor V, it disappeared.  We 
couldn’t retrieve it, we even went to see Gono [then Governor of the Central Bank], 
and we have never been able to get it back. We went to solicitors, we went to see the 
big people to say this money is for our programmes in the community, for orphans 
and vulnerable children but nothing happened. We have more than 100 million [then 
between US$ 5000 - $10000] owed to us. We wrote to our partner (Donor V) to say 
this is what has happened, it’s beyond our control, we can’t retrieve our money and 
the bank has been closed. They said you have broken the partnership agreement, 
these people they are now based in Zambia, that is one example of a donor who 
moved out of this country to another because of the NGO bill, they didn’t really 
support us, they cut their support” (SA –CBO X). 
 
While Donor V was not interviewed for this study, this incident spelt the end of the 
partnership though the money’s disappearance was beyond CBO X’s control. Crucially, it 
deprived children of intended support such as school fees and food. Donors were  also 
accused of not fully understanding the context and poor commitment as the participant 
further put in this way: 
“Our partners in the North don’t have a broader picture of things happening here. I 
gave you that example of the bank closing with our monies but the donor didn’t 
understand it.  Partners in the north don’t really comprehend the atmosphere here 
especially after the NGO bill. This environment is extremely challenging to work in 
and partners in the north need to understand this a bit more, their commitment to us 
in such challenging times is like today we are together and tomorrow we are not” 
(SA –CBO X). 
 
In line with this, hyperinflation posed programme-planning challenges as CBO staff put it this 
way: 
“Prices are not stagnant, they are always going up because of inflation which makes 
it difficult to do programming, we are constantly revising this, it makes planning 
difficult” (SB – CBO X). 
  
While INGO Y was flexible to review budgets, evidence shows some donors stuck to the 
original budgets leaving some activities incomplete:  
“Most of the intended activities were partially done because of increased costs and 
no funds were available to match the inflated budget. This is because donors require 
an annual budget and do not consider inflation to review budgets. This had a chain 
reaction as also schools increased their fees when CBO X had already paid giving it a 
deficit” (CBO X Participatory Review Workshop Report 2003:5). 
 
The official pegging of the Zimbabwean dollar against major currencies had major 
implications for development programs as the currency was overvalued resulting in the 
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emergence of a black market reflective of the actual supply and demand. INGO Y staff put it 
this way:  
“They [local partners] would benefit more but now it [currency] is controlled.  US$30 
000 is a different amount in a controlled regime than in a liberalised regime. You can 
see the gap between the exchange rate of $1000 [open market/black market] and 
the official rate of $250. Those resources could benefit the communities, that one is a 
key problem, economic crisis, it’s a major problem” (SC- INGO Y). 
 
This suggests that while development programmes lost out state coffers gained. While the 
same amount of money was of little value in Zimbabwe, in other countries it went a long 
way as explained below: 
“US$20 000 a year may not be enough but then we have some partners in Zambia, 
Mozambique getting the same amount of money and they are doing very well” (SD – 
INGO Y). 
 
Linked to economic crisis was the deterioration of public transport and lack of fuel which 
impacted negatively on development activities: 
“The deterioration of public transport and general shortage of fuel in the country has 
made it difficult for communities particularly in rural areas to interact regularly and 
effectively. It has been difficult for NGOs in general and some INGO partners to reach 
out to communities” (INGO Y, Annual Report 2005: 10). 
 
Advocacy and Lobbying Challenges  
Findings showed the need to engage in advocacy created tensions between CBO X and 
funding partners. CBO X staff bemoaned pressure from partners, as one put it this way: 
“INGOs and donors like to ask; what have you [CBO] done to fight for democracy? 
Like Donor W, they are very fond of all those things, but how do you do it, if your 
board says we cannot be involved in these things? Once you [CBO] come out in the 
open like that then people will say you are doing politics, but that isn’t the concept of 
the CBO X. CBO X are people who have problems that are social problems that are 
affecting them, and they want to deal with those problems and nothing else” (SA- 
CBO X). 
 
The management board alluded above is the CBO governing structure made up of 
community members.  Hence, the refusal of this board to engage in political related 
activities meant no implementation.    However, the quest to deal with nothing else other 
than the immediate social problems evidenced short sightedness regarding the role of a 
political approach in tackling root causes of poverty.   Staff appeared to share the board’s 
viewpoint as one put it this way:  
“For the partner, you get as a donor, they will say, you have to comply to being 
proactive, to argue for democracy, advocating for human rights and so on.  But, you 
know once you get yourself in such a situation, you are getting yourself in the 
political arena, then you are seen as CBO X arguing for advocacy, pressuring the 
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government to change certain things and then the government questions; are they a 
political group now?” (SB – CBO X). 
 
While pressure from donors was evident, there appeared a deep-rooted fear of being 
perceived as a political entity by the state.    However, INGO Y was aware of the challenges 
faced by its partners as noted: 
“Some communities are no go areas, depending on the politicians that are there.  
They are some crazy politicians who are suspicious of NGOs going into Human rights 
issues. They are suspicious about [NGOs] going into governance issues, it is like for 
them, you have no business to do civic education, to do governance” (SC – INGO Y). 
 
As suggested above, some politicians acted as gate keepers which made it impossible to 
engage communities. This made it challenging for INGO Y given its poverty eradication 
mission is grounded in a political approach which entails:   
“… creating political space for the activities of the poor; strengthening and building 
capacity in CSOs for political activities; engaging in issue – based advocacy and 
lobbying; providing linkages from the local to the national and international levels; 
building alliances between different actors in civil society; getting involved in broader 
social movements and providing links to the emerging global civil society” (INGO Y 
2005: 7- 8). 
 
However, the parameters of this political approach were clearly spelt out as: 
“[Not getting] involved in any way in party politics in the programme countries...  [there is a 
recognition] poverty can be reduced by concrete interventions of a service delivery nature… 
the impact of these is limited, hence must be linked to advocacy in order to produce a greater 
impact” (INGO Y 2005: 8). 
  
As explained, this does not relate to party politics. Faced with advocacy pressures, CBO X 
took cover under the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO):  
“For us [CBO X] to really make good relations with donors, we normally tell them we 
fight for democracy through our networks like NANGO, but they want to see you 
doing it, there on the forefront of it, that is where we don’t agree” (SA – CBO X). 
 
However, a local development consultant argued: 
“NANGO is a necessary nuisance because it is an umbrella body for NGOs, [but] it 
does absolutely nothing; it is really a convenience so that civil society should not look 
so stupid. Basically, NANGO really is one of the most useless organizations ever, it is 
not effective, it’s closer to the government than its members!” (KI P). 
 
Documentary evidence echoes similar sentiments by a Zimbabwean human rights lawyer 
and activist: 
“What mandate has NANGO to represent the NGOs? NANGO has only 250 members 
and in greater Harare alone, there are 1500 organisations!” (INGO Y- Zimbabwe 
Annual Meeting 2003:9). 
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Given these criticisms, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the umbrella body was 
questionable. This raised concerns regarding its ability to engage in advocacy on behalf of 
members. 
 
Discussion 
Oppressive Legislative Framework Implications 
This section discusses the implications of oppressive legislation on development in practice 
as follows: donor withdrawal leading to funding reduction and unpredictability; over 
extending legislation application by the police; stringent registration.  While the NGO bill 
was never signed into law, it caused havoc as some donors abandoned ship believing its 
legal status imminent, against a background of repressive laws such as the PVO act and 
POSA being enforced.  As donors relocated to neighboring countries, this translated to less 
funds on the ground (USAID 2008) leading to the collapse of some CSOs. Remaining donors 
moved from long term funding to short term.  This impacted negatively on CBO X as it could 
not make long terms plans which threatened the continuity of some programs. As CBO X 
contended with funding challenges, INGO Y felt under immense threat due to its political 
approach to poverty eradication which it was prepared to defend.  
           As ICNL (2016: 2) argue, to carry out their work appropriately, CSOs require, “the 
freedom to exercise three independent rights: the rights to peacefully assemble, freely 
associate and openly expressive themselves”. Findings suggest that on the back of POSA, the 
police denied some communities the right to peaceful assembly, even when agendas were 
none political.  This limited participation which is crucial for sustainable development 
(Madziva 2017). While international CSOs are often accused of paying lip service to 
participation due to its costly nature (Harris 2008), these findings indicate that oppressive  
legislation can restrict participation. Hence, participation is not entirely dependent on 
international CSOs’ willingness to resource, but equally requires an enabling legislative 
environment.    
       State use of restrictive legislative frameworks has been identified in countries such as 
Ethiopia, Eretria, Tanzania, Kenya, Egypt (ICNL 2016; Michael 2004). While some of these 
countries are not labelled fragile states, the World Bank (1997) notes that many African 
states use NGO legislation to restrict the sanctioned activities of CSOs from the political 
realm.  Arguably, Africa is home to many fragile states (Fund for Peace 2017) and protecting 
political hegemony through oppressive legislation appears a shared characteristic between 
fragile and some none fragile states. However, due to authority and legitimacy failures, it 
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can be argued that fragile states are more likely to utilize oppressive legislation to maintain 
the status quo.   As Kagoro (2005) argues, given Zimbabwe’s pre -independence history 
whereby CSOs tended to transform to political entities, state desire to thwart them isn’t 
surprising.   After the bill was shelved, findings show that the relationship between the state 
and CSOs remained contentious with the former continuing to threaten CSOs existence 
which created uncertainty. For instance, before 2013 elections, the government accused 29 
NGOs of engaging in political activities and suspended them leading to HIV/AIDS care and 
food distribution services being delayed with some being indefinitely suspended (ICNL 
2016).   
          After CSOs registration became mandatory in 2002, 6 years after CBO X formation, 
findings indicate it took the CBO over 5 years to obtain this.  The process was claimed 
arduous as though intended to discourage registration, which agrees with findings by Nassli 
(2014) in the case of Uganda. On this note, ICNL (2016: 3) argues: 
 
“State authorities can exploit their decision-making powers to delay registration or 
renewal applications indefinitely or to arbitrarily interpret the law, strictly enforcing 
and harshly interpreting the smallest details against organizations deemed 
undesirable”.  
 
Writing about NGOs in Africa, Michael (2004) notes that African governments tend to curb 
CSOs power by exerting undue control on registration which is closely intertwined with the 
use of oppressive legislation to keep CSOs from engaging with political activities connected 
to their development agendas.  Eritrean, one of the poorest and most fragile states is known 
to have introduced extremely stringent registration requirements which forced most INGOs 
to leave the country in 2011 (ICNL 2016). Hayman et al. (2014) attributes this to contexts 
lacking state-citizen accountability which is particularly the case with fragile states. 
Moreover, registration challenges potentially mitigate against the implementation of 
development projects given donors’ reluctance to work with unregistered organizations. The 
need for caution is understandable given the case of ‘briefcase NGOs’, a wide spread 
phenomenon in Sub Saharan Africa albeit rare in Zimbabwe (Michael 2004).  However, 
where registration is not mandatory, donors and INGOs seeking potential partners in fragile 
contexts should be flexible as some states use their power to control and purposively 
frustrate the process.    
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Work permit challenges  
This section discusses the implications of work permit challenges on development activities. 
In line with the hostile legislative framework, findings showed that INGO T expatriate staff 
faced challenges with obtaining and renewing work permits with some receiving deportation 
orders. This posed continuation challenges for some development programs while 
exacerbating the atmosphere of uncertainty. Evidence indicates that Médecins Sans 
Frontières, experienced difficulties in securing and renewing work permits for staff to 
respond to the 2008 – 2009 Zimbabwe cholera outbreak despite the acute shortage of 
medical professionals (Fournier and Whittall 2009). Another INGO, Catholic Relief Services 
was forced to leave Eretria due to similar challenges (ICNL 2016).  This shows that states can 
be obstructive at the expense of citizens in dire need.  Given that at the time this study was 
conducted, INGO T had been in Zimbabwe for over 20 years, much of that a period of 
relative state stability without similar challenges, it can be postulated that state fragility 
contributed to these work permit challenges.  Worth reiterating is that the NGO bill sought 
to protect state political hegemony by prohibiting the registration of INGOs focusing on 
governance issues, a key focus of INGO T. Hence, work permits denials and restrictions may 
have been a strategy to weaken INGO T before the proposed legislation came into force.  
 
Financial Distress implications  
This section discusses the impact of hyperinflation, bank closures, overvalued pegged 
currency and the introduction of bond notes on development activities. The case of CBO X 
and Donor V shows that state failure to implement sound monetary and fiscal policy 
impacted negatively development in practice. The disappearance of CBO X’s money in a 
bank closure spelt the partnership’s end. Crucially, this led to development activities for 
children not being implemented as intended. The response of Donor V to terminate the 
partnership on the pretext of a broken partnership agreement raises questions regarding 
donors’ ability to appreciate risks associated with operating in fragile contexts. However, the 
case of Zimbabwe is not unique given past northern financial crisis. For instance, the 2007-
2008 financial crisis showed that even long standing financial institutions can face a 
meltdown due to state failure to adequately regulate and monitor financial services (Soros 
2008).  The difference is that some northern financial systems, offer a measure of protection 
to customers in the event of financial mishaps, unlike in Zimbabwe where CBO X could not 
get anything back. This calls for extra scrutiny when banking in heterogeneous fragile 
contexts where financial systems may be unsound.  For this reason, conducting contextual 
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analysis may avail funding partners with in-depth understanding of contextual complexities 
and irregularities requiring extra consideration at planning levels as opposed to situational 
analysis as used by most CSOs (Foster 2002). 
          Findings also showed development programs lost money due to the overvalued 
pegged currency, as organisations were forced to exchange donor dollars through official 
channels while the black-market rate was 3 times over the official exchange rate.  On this 
note, it can be argued that to some extent, state coffers gained while activities intended for 
the poor lost out. In the same vein, the introduction of bond notes has been viewed as an 
attempt to introduce a valueless local currency thereby making US$ secured by CSOs only 
accessible to the Central Bank (ICNL 2017).  
            Hyperinflation made program planning extremely difficult resulting in most intended 
program activities facing partial implementation as donors would not revise budgets to cater 
for shortfalls, e.g. school fees for children not being fully paid leaving the CBO in debt.  In the 
same vein, the acute public transport and fuel shortage which led to a nationwide near 
paralysis (The Economist 2005) compromised some development activities, particularly in 
rural areas due to limited interactions among communities who mostly depend on face to 
face communication due to the digital divide. This also made it difficult for INGO Y’s 
partners, as well as other CSOs in the country to reach out to communities. 
 Currently, the country faces a cash crisis with imposed cash withdrawal limitations and the 
loathed bond notes have fuelled a black market with the U$S facing extinction on the open 
market (The Economist 2017). As ICNL (2017) note, cash withdrawal limitations have 
severely curtailed CSOs’ access to funds with negative program implications. While the 
financial crisis in Zimbabwe highlights state role in implementing appropriate monetary 
policy, it also underscores the need to sufficiently consider unique contextual factors so as 
to understand how specific fragile contexts impact on development in practice, the key 
argument advanced in this paper.  Of all the countries classified as fragile states, none 
experienced Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation rated the highest in the 21st century at 80 billion 
(The Economist 2016). Hence, while there are probable similarities in fragile contexts, some 
underlying factors remain unique to specific contexts. 
 
Advocacy and Lobbying Challenges    
This section discusses advocacy and lobbying challenges alongside considering how these 
challenges potentially impact on the work of global policy advocacy networks. Findings 
showed CBO X viewed advocacy an undesirable engagement in politics beyond its social 
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provision remit which concurs with findings by Michael (2004) among other local 
organizations in Zimbabwe and Tanzania.  Fear of being deemed political with threats of 
deregistration by the state underpinned this position. Given the proposed NGO bill sought to 
thwart CSOs from the political realm and state intimidation, CBO X’s reluctance was hardly 
surprising.  Furthermore, this reluctance must be viewed in the context of Zimbabwe’s 
colonial and post-independence history which Moyo (1993) credits with inflicting mass 
violence among rural communities. Thus despite signing a partnership agreement with INGO 
T with an advocacy component and receiving relevant training (Madziva 2017), CBO X’s 
narrow social services focus tallies with Moyo‘s assertion that CSOs formed in Zimbabwe’s 
rural contexts  have no interests beyond their immediate concerns. This position put CBO X 
at odds with INGO Y’s political approach to poverty eradication, as well as other donors. 
While it can be postulated that INGO T may not have been thorough with its partner 
selection process in terms of the political approach to poverty eradication as a shared 
partnership objective, by virtue of focusing on child rights as one of its key mandates, CBO 
X’s reluctance to engage in advocacy was paradoxical. However, it’s noteworthy that it did 
not completely shy away from advocacy as it engaged local communities around child rights 
related issues (Madziva, 2017).  This appears to indicate service oriented CBOs can willingly 
engage in certain types of advocacy, with a red line drawn for activities deemed political 
because of state fear.   For instance, seeking state accountability in relation to the realization 
of child rights may be deemed political in comparison to raising awareness of child rights 
among local communities. As findings indicate, human rights and governance issues 
attracted pronounced hostility from local politicians who acted as gate keepers, hence the 
CBO relegated this to its umbrella body. This agrees with findings by Safaids (2012), ICNL 
(2017) and Michael (2004) where CSOs seeking state accountability and human rights issues 
faced state harassment, arrests and in some cases torture which reinforces the idea of a 
state fearful of losing political hegemony. As Michael (2004), points out in the case of 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania, the latter though not identified as fragile, state fear has 
increasingly led to limited political space for CSOs’ engagement in advocacy and lobbying.  
Against this backdrop, it can be posited that fragile states are more likely to adopt this 
stance due to legitimacy and authority failures.  Despite these challenges, CSOs must 
recognize that social services provision without confronting the root causes of poverty 
embedded in politics is not sustainable and has negative implications on development 
agendas nationally and globally.      
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                First, reluctance to engage in advocacy risks diminishing state accountability to the 
marginalized as CSOs can provide checks and balances on the state (Peruzzotti 2006). 
Secondly, the state risks formulating of ill-informed policies due to disengagement with 
those marginalized.  Evidence suggests CBOs are more trusted by the marginalized than 
other institutions and are most likely to be cognizant of local needs than outsiders (Narayan 
et al., 2000).  This places a burden of responsibility on CBOs to advocate on behalf of those 
they purport to represent. As Michael (2004: 155) argues: 
“But within whatever field they choose to be active, local NGOs [and CBOs] must be 
ready to confront the underlying social and political forces that perpetuate 
underdevelopment …[because] without confronting these political elements within 
development, local NGOs will never truly be able to change the lives of the poor and 
marginalised in their regions.” 
 
This is not a call for alignment with political parties, but seeking state accountability in line 
with sanctioned development mandates. On this note, the drive by CBO X’s other donor for 
it to engage in political activities, such as ‘fighting for democracy’ an aspect not directly 
aligned to its development agenda appears misplaced. This potentially causes more harm 
than good by driving away organisations from advocacy due to the perceived limited 
connection between this and their sanctioned activities. While organizations can organically 
develop to ‘fight for democracy’, as a starting point, they should be supported to focus on 
political activities directly connected to their sanctioned development agendas. As argued 
elsewhere (Madziva 2017), INGOs are well placed to support CBO capacity building to 
engage in advocacy through partnerships given their expertise, which INGO T already does. 
However, this requires challenging the ‘immediate concern’ mind set, show casing the 
importance of advocacy and empowering communities to understand how their 
development agendas are connected to politics. The state’s role in opening up the political 
space remains crucial.  The historical cases of Bolivia, Colombia and Brazil show that states 
can open up political space for CSOs with positive outcomes in terms of influencing national 
policy agendas (World Bank 1997).  
         INGOs also face criticism for insufficient linkages with the poorest in the south, whom 
they purport to represent in relation to advocacy. This is on two fronts, i.e. inadequate 
funding allocations to advocacy (Anderson 2000) and limited participation by southern CSOs 
in international policy debates (Edwards 2000). This study however found the opposite as 
CBO X was under immense pressure from northern partners to engage in advocacy.  It 
responded by taking cover under NANGO, whose integrity, at the time of study, was subject 
to criticism for having closer ties with the state and being at odds with its raison d‘être 
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(Michael 2004; Raftopolous 2000). Michael (2004) similarly highlights donors’ 
uncharacteristic eagerness to fund advocacy in Zimbabwe while courting controversy and 
threats for it. This is attributed to the contentious relationship between the state and CSOs 
as follows:   
“As the government, has sought to repress local NGOs working in the areas of 
lobbying and advocacy, donor confidence in the government has waned and donors 
have increased their support to NGOs. This has resulted in conflict, both over money 
and over political space” (Michael 2004: 65). 
 
It could be further argued that donors largely blame the state for the prevailing 
socioeconomic and political crisis, hence supporting CSOs is an attempt to hold it 
accountable.   However, the CSOs Michael (2004) identified as having incorporated advocacy 
in program activities appear urban based.  Rural based CBOs contend with additional gate 
keepers, such as traditional leadership who are meant to be nonpartisan custodians of rural 
communities, but due to political polarization, are known to unleash violence to opposition 
party supporters at the behest of the ruling party (Baldwin and Muvengwa, 2014). On this 
note, context, whether urban or rural appears to impact on the nature and extent of 
advocacy engagement.  Nonetheless, despite this incorporation, Michael (2004) argues that 
CSOs in Zimbabwe still lack opportunities to participate in higher-level policy decision-
making due to the state’s grip over political space.   
              While it has been argued that INGO linkages with CBOs and NGOs in the south can 
improve INGO legitimacy in global policy debates (Edwards 2000) the case of CBO X shows 
that linkages in fragile contexts may not be as productive. Though such linkages are a 
desirable starting point, state repression remains a major obstacle.  The potential 
engagement of southern CSOs in advocacy at international levels while bypassing national 
and local levels potentially arms repressive states with propaganda thereby dismissing global 
led advocacy networks on country specific issues as northern agendas.  
 
Study Limitations 
This study is based on a partnership case study; hence these findings cannot be generalized 
(Bryman 2008).  However, the contribution of an example to the accumulation of a relevant 
knowledge base remains crucial (Flyvbjerg 2004). This is because though methods designed 
to enable generalizations are extremely useful, they would not, on their own enable access 
to the complexities of a fragile context and implications on development activities. 
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed to explore the impact of contextual fragility on development in practice. 
Against a backdrop of Zimbabwe’s past embedded in political violence, the study showed 
how an oppressive legislative framework limited communities participation which is crucial 
for sustainable development. The proposed NGO bill, though never signed to law, caused 
donors to jump ship leading to the collapse of some local organisations due to limited 
funding availability.  Fearful of attracting state reproach, the CBO was reluctant to engage in 
advocacy activities deemed political despite donors’ eagerness. As the most trusted 
institutions among the poor, CBOs have a greater burden of responsibility to confront the 
political forces which perpetuate their marginalization.  Due to their expertise, INGOs are 
well placed to support rural CBOs in this endeavour through capacity development. 
Hyperinflation, bank closures and a pegged currency led to a partnership termination, partial 
and non-implementation of some intended development activities. Given these challenges, 
gaining a complete picture of fragility in each context should be a starting point for northern 
seeking to partner in such contexts. While the use of oppressive legislation and stringent 
registration to curb CSOs’ engagement in political activities is a common thread among 
fragile and some none fragile states fearful of losing their political hegemony, the case of 
hyperinflation shows that, some factors are unique to specific fragile contexts. Hence, 
unmasking the heterogeneous nature of fragile contexts requires conducting contextual 
analysis for each context as this is likely to capture complexities and irregularities which may 
require extra considerations at program planning stages.  
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